Somebody asked if your store is exposed. Answer with evidence.
An Adobe Commerce security audit tells you what your store is actually running, whether the PolyShell fix from Adobe's July 2026 update (APSB26-73) is really in your code, and what is sitting in your media folders that should not be. You get a written document, with the evidence behind every finding, that you can forward to whoever asked.
Ask AI about this audit
Is your store on a patched build?
PolyShell (CVE-2026-48356) lets someone upload a file your store should never accept, without logging in. Adobe fixed it first in the 2.4.9 line. On 14 July 2026 its security update APSB26-73 shipped the fix for older lines too, as builds named for the month: 2.4.8-2026-jul, 2.4.7-2026-jul and 2.4.6-2026-jul, and on Adobe Commerce back to 2.4.4.
So the question is not which version you are on. It is whether that update, or a later one, is actually installed and still there after your last deploy, and whether anything was uploaded before it went on. A patch stops new uploads. It does not remove what is already on disk.
What can an Adobe Commerce security audit actually tell you?
Most people selling security work are vague about this on purpose. We would rather you knew the shape of the answer before you pay for it.
What we can establish
- What your store is really running.
- The version and patch level read out of the code, not out of what
composer.jsonclaims it installed. - Whether the July 2026 fix is actually in your
vendor/directory. - A version string can say one thing and the installed code another. Either the fix is in the code or it is not, and it takes a minute to check.
- What your webserver will execute.
- Whether a PHP file dropped in your media folder would run, or come back as a 404. That one config block is what stands between "a file on disk" and "code running on your server".
- What is sitting in
pub/mediathat is not an image. - Including the folder that custom-option uploads land in.
- Which admin accounts and integration tokens still exist.
- Who they belong to, when they were last used, and which ones nobody remembers creating.
What an audit cannot establish, and we will not pretend otherwise
- That your data was not taken.
- Nobody can prove a negative here. Anyone who tells you they can is selling you something.
- That nothing ran, if your logs have rotated.
- Access logs are the record of whether a file was ever requested. Most stores keep 14 to 30 days of them. Before that window, the honest answer is "we cannot tell".
- That an attacker left nothing we did not look for.
- We check the places this class of bug puts things, and the places the published research says to check. That is a thorough look. It is not a guarantee about every file on a server.
Every finding in your document says which of these two lists it came from. The "we could not determine this" list is part of the deliverable, not a disclaimer at the bottom.
What we check
- 1 Your real version and patch level
- Read from the installed code. We have seen plenty of stores where the composer file and the running code disagree about what is actually deployed.
- 2 Whether the PolyShell fix is present
- APSB26-73 carries the fix for CVE-2026-48356. We look for it in the installed code, not in the version string. On 2.4.8-p5 and earlier builds it is not there.
- 3 What your webserver will and will not run
- The PHP entry-point allowlist, the
deny allaround it, and whether one rule is doing all the work. This is a mitigation, not a fix - the files still get written, and one config change turns them live. -
4
Everything in
pub/mediathat is not an image - Including
.php,.phtmland.pharfiles, files with an executable extension buried in the middle of the name, and image files carrying something extra after the image data. - 5 Admin accounts and integration tokens
- Every account, every API token, when each was last used. This is where the forgotten one lives - the integration user your ERP connector signs in as, created years ago by whoever built it. We have built and maintained those connectors against Epicor Prophet 21, Infor and QuickBooks, so we know where they hide.
- 6 Whether your patches survive a deploy
- Hand-applied patches live under
vendor/, which git ignores and composer rewrites. A patch someone applied in March is often gone by April, with nothing in the repo to show it was ever there. We check whether yours are re-applied on install, or whether they quietly vanish.
How the audit works
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1
You give us read access.
The code and the server, read-only. If that is a problem this week, we will send you the exact commands to run yourself and you send back the output. Either way works, and we will tell you which one gives a better answer.
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2
We look.
Read-only, start to finish. We change nothing, deploy nothing, and touch no data.
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3
You get the document.
Every finding written out with a severity, the evidence it rests on, and the command or file it came from, so your team can verify any of it without us. Then an explicit list of what we could not determine, and why. That list is in every document we write, including the clean ones.
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4
You decide what happens next.
If you want the fixes, we come back with a price in points and the reasoning behind it, and you approve it before anything starts. If you would rather hand the document to your own team or another agency, that is a completely fine outcome and the document is written so they can act on it.
Fixing what we find
If you want us to do the remediation, we price the work in points and send it to you with the reasoning and how confident we are in the estimate. You approve it before we touch anything.
Points are the unit every piece of work here is priced in. You see and approve a point price for each task before it starts, instead of reading an invoice afterwards and wondering.
Common questions
Do you do incident response?
Yes. If you think something is running on your store right now, say so when you write and we will treat it differently from an audit - different first steps, preserve the logs, do not delete the files yet, and we start today rather than tomorrow. One thing we will be straight about: we are a development team that has cleaned up and hardened Adobe Commerce stores for years, not a forensics lab. If the evidence points at card data or something you have to report, we will say so, tell you to bring in specialists, and work alongside them rather than pretend we are them.
Will you just quote me for the fixes?
No. The document is yours either way, and it is written so your own team or another agency can act on it without calling us. We quote remediation only if you ask for it, in points, approved before anything starts. If you read the findings and fix everything yourself in an afternoon, that is a good outcome and we will say so.
Can you prove my data was not taken?
No, and neither can anyone else. What we can do is tell you what the logs still show, what they no longer cover, and what is on disk today. If your access logs still cover the relevant window, they will show whether anyone ever requested a file that should not exist, and what your server answered. If they have rotated, that window is simply gone, and we will say so in the document rather than quietly leave it out.
Which versions does this apply to?
PolyShell (CVE-2026-48356) affects Magento Open Source and Adobe Commerce builds from before Adobe's July 2026 update: 2.4.8-p5, 2.4.7-p10, 2.4.6-p15 and everything earlier. Adobe fixed it first in the 2.4.9 line, then in APSB26-73 on 14 July 2026, in the 2026-jul builds of 2.4.6 through 2.4.9, and of 2.4.4 and 2.4.5 on Adobe Commerce. The audit itself runs on any 2.4.x store, including Mage-OS. Reviewed November 2026.
Do I need to upgrade to fix this?
Not for this one, if your store is on a build that carries APSB26-73 or a later update. But a version only stays safe while each update is actually installed, and your version decides how long Adobe keeps shipping them. What the audit gives you is the information to decide whether an upgrade is this month's problem or next quarter's, and to say which it is to whoever is asking.
Will the audit affect my ERP connection or my integrations?
No. Everything we do is read-only - we run checks and read files, we deploy nothing and change nothing. We do look closely at integration accounts and API tokens, because that is where a forgotten connector login tends to sit, and a store whose ERP has been talking to it for six years usually has a few. If we find one that should be retired, it goes in the document with the evidence; retiring it is a separate decision you make.
Talk to us
Find out what your store is actually running.
Tell us what you are seeing and what you need to answer. You get a written document with the evidence behind every finding, and an explicit list of what we could not determine.
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